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The comparator account holds that processes of motor prediction contribute to the sense
of agency by attenuating incoming sensory information and that disruptions to this process
contribute to misattributions of agency in schizophrenia. Over the last 25 years this simple
and powerful model has gained widespread support not only as it relates to bodily actions
but also as an account of misattributions of agency for inner speech, potentially explaining
the etiology of auditory verbal hallucination (AVH). In this paper we provide a detailed
analysis of the traditional comparator account for inner speech, pointing out serious
problems with the specification of inner speech on which it is based and highlighting
inconsistencies in the interpretation of the electrophysiological evidence commonly cited
in its favor. In light of these analyses we propose a new comparator account of
misattributed inner speech. The new account follows leading models of motor imagery
in proposing that inner speech is not attenuated by motor prediction, but rather derived
directly from it. We describe how failures of motor prediction would therefore directly
affect the phenomenology of inner speech and trigger a mismatch in the comparison
between motor prediction and motor intention, contributing to abnormal feelings of
agency. We argue that the new account fits with the emerging phenomenological
evidence that AVHs are both distinct from ordinary inner speech and heterogeneous.
Finally, we explore the possibility that the new comparator account may extend to explain
disruptions across a range of imagistic modalities, and outline avenues for future research.
Keywords: sense of agency, inner speech, comparator model, schizophrenia, efference copy, auditory verbal
hallucination
INTRODUCTION
Patients seeking psychiatric help often describe unusual expe-
riences and beliefs, such as reporting that their body is under
the control of another agent, that they hear voices when there
is no one there, or that thoughts are being inserted into their
minds. Within psychiatry these reports are classified as delusions
of alien control, auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) and delu-
sions of thought insertion, respectively (Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders; 5th ed.; DSM-V, American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). Such symptoms provide significant weight
towards a diagnosis of schizophrenia. While diagnostically dis-
tinct, it has been argued that these particular symptoms may
share an etiological core, stemming from disruptions to the sense
of agency, where the sense of agency refers to the experience of
the self as causing and directing one’s actions (e.g., Stephens and
Graham, 2003; Jones and Fernyhough, 2007; Langland-Hassan,
2008; Synofzik et al., 2008a; Frith, 2012; Sousa and Swiney, 2013).
Over the last 25 years the comparator account has emerged as
the dominant model of the sense of agency and its disruptions in
schizophrenia. It draws on a well-established model of the motor
control system that holds that the likely sensory consequences of
a given motor act are predicted by a forward model, and that this
prediction attenuates the actual incoming sensory information.
The core idea of the comparator account is that a match between
this prediction and the actual sensory information ordinarily
gives rise to sense of self-agency. In schizophrenia, disruptions
in the process of prediction are proposed to lead to a mismatch,
giving rise to a sense of non-self agency (Frith et al., 2000a; Frith,
2005a,b, 2012).
The comparator account of the sense of agency most straight-
forwardly describes how bodily actions may come to be experi-
enced as non-self produced, giving rise to reports of delusions
of alien control (Frith, 2005a). From its inception, however,
theorists have held out the possibility that the account could
extend to mental acts such inner speech, potentially explaining
symptoms of AVH and/or thought insertion (Feinberg, 1978;
Frith, 1992, 2005b, 2012). This extension is based on the proposal
that inner speech production may draw on the same mechanisms
of motor control as bodily actions, and may therefore be subject
to the same disruptions in motor prediction. Other theorists have
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recently taken up the task of providing a precise specification of
how such disruptions might manifest relation to inner speech,
giving rise to AVH (Seal et al., 2004; Jones and Fernyhough,
2007) or both AVH and thought insertion (Langland-Hassan,
2008).
The basic plausibility of extending the comparator account
beyond bodily actions to explain misattributed inner speech is
ubiquitously accepted both within the expanding literature on the
sense of agency (e.g., Vosgerau and Newen, 2007; Synofzik et al.,
2008a) and beyond (e.g., Carruthers, 2011; Whitford et al., 2012).
Authors regularly appeal to the account as a plausible explanation
for results from behavioral studies (e.g., Li et al., 2002; Johns et al.,
2006). The account also forms the basis of a large-scale research
program investigating the electrophysiological characteristics of
the brain during speech and inner speech in schizophrenia (for a
recent review see Ford and Mathalon, 2012). Even among those
who critique the account on phenomenological grounds (Wu,
2012) or who argue that the account requires extensions (Synofzik
et al., 2008a), the viability of the basic tenants of the comparator
account—that inner speech is normally predicted and attenuated
and that failures in this process contribute to misattribution—
appears to be unproblematically accepted.
Counter to this consensus, we will argue that there are
fundamental problems with the comparator account of misat-
tributed inner speech as it has traditionally been formulated.
These problems relate both to the plausibility of the account’s
specification of inner speech within the motor control system,
and to the electrophysiological evidence widely taken to sup-
port the account. However, given the emerging evidence for the
comparator account as it applies to misattributions of bodily
actions in schizophrenia (for a recent overview see Frith, 2012),
we acknowledge that the possibility of a unified account of
symptoms such as delusions of alien control, AVH and thought
insertion provides significant motivation to pursue a comparator
account of misattributed inner speech. To this end, we outline a
substantially new and revised account of how failures in motor
production could give rise to misattributed inner speech. Our
account is based on a plausible and cognitively justified model
of the production of inner speech in the motor control sys-
tem, and makes novel predictions about both the phenomenol-
ogy and neural mechanisms associated with misattributed inner
speech.
THE TRADITIONAL COMPARATOR ACCOUNT OF
MISATTRIBUTED INNER SPEECH
THE COMPARATOR MODEL OF THE MOTOR CONTROL SYSTEM
Drawing from ideas on the importance of internal processes of
comparison for regulation and control (Helmholtz, 1886; Holst
and Mittelstadt, 1950; Sperry, 1950), experimental and compu-
tational work over the last years has contributed to our knowl-
edge of the mechanisms constituting motor cognition—those
that, at a subpersonal level, generate, control and monitor our
physical movements (e.g., Kawato and Wolpert, 1998; Wolpert
and Flanagan, 2001; Blakemore et al., 2002; Lindner et al., 2005;
Wolpert et al., 2011). The result is the comparator model of motor
control. The model posits a system that utilizes feedback and
feedforward control loops in conjunction with three comparator
mechanisms to direct, control and adjust motor actions. The
fundamental job of the motor system is to generate movement
by issuing motor commands (see Figure 1). If you want to lift
your hand from your lap the motor control system generates
the motor command that will guide your hand from your actual
state (hand in the lap) to your desired state (hand above the
lap). The representation of your actual state is derived from the
current sensory experience of having your hand in your lap, and is
therefore always an estimation. The representation of your desired
state is based on your goal (to have the hand above the lap).
These two representations (estimated actual state, desired state)
are compared in the first comparator (C1) and sent to an inverse
model that will specify the motor command necessary to get from
the estimated actual state (hand in the lap) to the desired state
(hand above the lap).
The system also uses the motor command to predict the
sensory consequences of a given act; representing the predicted
state (Miall et al., 1993; Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000). This is
achieved through the production of a duplicate of the motor com-
mand known as the efference copy. This efference copy is sent to a
forward model that uses it to predict the sensory consequences of
issuing the motor command (Holst and Mittelstadt, 1950). This
predicted state is compared to the desired state in the second
comparator (C2), allowing the motor command to be checked
even before it is issued.
The predicted state is also compared to the incoming sensory
information (the new actual state, relating to the hand now being
above the lap) in the third comparator (C3), allowing for adjust-
ments when the movement does not go according to plan. This
comparison in the third comparator is often described in terms
of a process of attenuation; the idea is that sensory information
that is the result of self-generated movement is attenuated or
“canceled out” by the matching predicted state. Evidence for this
process includes our inability to tickle ourselves. The incoming
sensory information (the tickle) is predicted by the motor control
system and so is cancelled out or attenuated (Blakemore et al.,
1998). This attenuation is also held to account for other aspects
of our phenomenology, such as our experience of a stable visual
field (Langland-Hassan, 2008). If you were to move one of your
eyes indirectly, without issuing the relevant motor command,
your visual experience is that the world (and not your eye) is
moving. You can demonstrate this by covering one eye and then
pressing gently on the side of the other; the visual scene appears
to move. However, if you cover one eye and then move the other
from side to side in the normal fashion (i.e., without the aid of
your finger), you will have the normal sensation of vision with
a stable visual field. The process of attenuation by the predicted
state is not restricted to touch and vision; when we speak, the
predicted auditory consequences are relayed to auditory sen-
sory areas where incoming sound is attenuated (Greenlee et al.,
2010).
The comparator model of motor control, and in particular
the proposal of internal comparator mechanisms, has acquired
considerable support (e.g., Kawato and Wolpert, 1998) and there
is emerging evidence that such a model can be instantiated within
the networks of the brain (Frith, 2005b; Ramnani, 2006; Knolle
et al., 2012).
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FIGURE 1 | The comparator model of the motor control system and the
comparator account of the sense of agency for bodily action in normal
cognition. Those processes central to the present discussion are in black,
the remainder in gray. In this simple model of the motor control system three
states are represented internally: the desired state, the predicted state, and
the estimated current state. According to the comparator account of the
sense of agency for bodily action, the production of the predicted state
results in a feeling of initiation. Because the predicted state matches the
sensory feedback from the new actual state, the comparison in comparator
three, gives rise to a feeling of self-production. It is proposed that, in
schizophrenia, disruptions to the predicted state lead to abnormalities in both
the feeling of initiation and the feeling of self-production for bodily actions (for
further details see main text; figure modified after Frith et al., 2000b;
Blakemore et al., 2002; Synofzik et al., 2008a).
THE COMPARATOR ACCOUNT OF THE SENSE OF ABNORMAL AGENCY
FOR BODILY ACTION
The comparator account of the sense of agency for bodily action
proposes that as well as explaining the adjustment and control of
motor action, the mechanisms of the motor control system can
also provide an account of the sense of agency and its disruption
in delusions of alien control (Frith et al., 2000a,b; Blakemore
et al., 2002; Frith, 2005a, 2012). The account proposes that in
normal cognition the generation of the predicted state underlies
the sense of self-agency (see Figure 1). Firstly, during ordinary
movement, the comparison of the predicted state to the incoming
sensory information (in the third comparator, C3) should reveal
a match, allowing self-generated movements to be distinguished
from sensory feedback that is non self-generated, and giving rise
to a feeling of self-production. In addition, the account holds that
the mere generation of the predicted state may also contribute
to the sense of agency, by giving rise to a feeling of initiation
(Blakemore et al., 2002).
In schizophrenia, the predicted state is proposed to be faulty
in some way, interfering with both of these aspects of the sense
of agency and giving rise to delusions of alien control. Firstly, a
faulty or absent predicted state leads to a lack of the feeling of
initiation. Because the patient is not aware of having initiated the
movement, “[i]t is as if the movement, although intended, has
been initiated by some external force” (Blakemore et al., 2002,
p. 240). Secondly, a faulty or absent predicted state would lead
to a mismatch in the third comparator, meaning that the sensory
consequences of the self-generated movement are not attenuated.
It is proposed that this failure of attenuation leads to a feeling of
non-self-production.
The account has received considerable empirical support from
studies indicating that problems in predicting the sensory conse-
quences of action are associated with schizophrenia (Blakemore
et al., 2000; Shergill et al., 2005; Leube et al., 2010), as well as evi-
dence of functional and structural abnormalities in schizophrenia
in many of the brain regions suggested to play a role in motor
prediction (for recent overviews of this evidence see Farrer and
Franck, 2007; Voss et al., 2010; Pynn and DeSouza, 2013). There
are also plausible neurobiological accounts consistent with the
cognitive account (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Whitford et al., 2012).
A popular way to classify accounts of the sense of agency has
been to draw a distinction between “top-down” and “bottom-
up” approaches. Top-down approaches are those that explain
misattributions by appealing to disruptions in interpretive pro-
cesses incorporating conceptual information about the self
(e.g., Wegner, 2002; Stephens and Graham, 2003). By contrast,
bottom-up approaches are those that explain misattributions of
agency by appealing to disruptions in subpersonal, automatic,
non-interpretive processes. This widespread distinction between
top-down and bottom-up etiological accounts mirrors the recent
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explication of two distinct functional and representational levels
at which the sense of agency can be usefully analyzed (Synofzik
et al., 2008a). One is the level of feeling of agency, which is argued
to represent the non-conceptual, low-level feeling of being the
agent of an action, at which level the self can only be implic-
itly represented. The other is the level of judgment of agency,
which refers to the interpretive, conceptual judgment of being
the agent of an action at the level of the narrative self. One
way that these levels have been elucidated has been to appeal
to the experience of optical illusions (e.g., Bayne, 2011). The
Müller-Lyer illusion consists of two lines of identical length; one
of the lines has arrows on either end that point inwards, and
the other has arrows that point outwards. Even when we are
able to make the conceptual judgment that the two lines are of
the same length (for instance, after we have measured them),
we continue to have the visual experience of them as different
lengths. Something like this distinction is understood to hold
for subjective experiences such as the experience of agency for
inner speech (Bayne, 2011). A person may reach the conceptual
judgment that an episode of inner speech was self-produced (for
instance, on the basis that there is no one else in the room), but
they may nonetheless have the first-person feeling that the episode
was non self-produced.
The comparator account of the sense of agency provides a
bottom-up account that explains the cognitive generation of
subpersonal feelings of agency. As such it has been criticized for
suggesting that a non-conceptual feeling of non-self agency could
fully account for a conceptual judgment of external agency (e.g.,
Synofzik et al., 2008a). However, it is worth noting that propo-
nents of the comparator account have always maintained that
additional disruptions to the patient’s belief system are required
to explain how the abnormal feelings of agency are interpreted
in an irrational way (Blakemore et al., 2002; Frith, 2012). Most
recently, Synofzik et al. have incorporated the comparator account
of the sense of agency into their multifactorial weighting model
(MWM). This model holds that a variety of top-down and
bottom-up cues—including feelings of agency issuing from the
motor control system—are ordinarily integrated to give rise to the
sense of agency (Synofzik et al., 2008a,b, 2009a,b, 2013; Synofzik
and Voss, 2010; Synofzik and Vosgerau, 2012).
THE COMPARATOR ACCOUNT OF THE SENSE OF ABNORMAL AGENCY
FOR INNER SPEECH
Besides explaining misattributions of bodily actions such as
delusions of control, proponents of the comparator model have
often aimed to extend the account to explain the misattribu-
tion of mental acts (Feinberg, 1978, 2011; Frith, 1992, 2012).
In recent years this has taken shape in the proposal that the
same motor control-based disruption in predictive processes
may impact the experience of inner speech, underlying symp-
toms of AVH and even thought insertion. Up to one fourth
of our conscious mental life is comprised of “talking” to our-
selves silently in our minds (Heavey and Hurlburt, 2008).
Since AVH consists of reporting a voice when none is present,
it is plausible that inner speech may form the basis of the
hallucinatory experience. A variety of cognitive models have
been proposed to explain how we might ordinarily come to
have the subjective, internal experience of thought in natural
language (e.g., Levelt, 1983; Kinsbourne, 2000; Fernyhough, 2004;
Kosslyn, 2005; Carruthers, 2006; Baddeley, 2007). The compara-
tor account of inner speech holds that similar motor control
processes will underpin the production of sentences in natu-
ral language whether they are “spoken” internally or externally.
On this basis, several theorists have provided detailed accounts
of a comparator account for misattributed inner speech (Seal
et al., 2004; Jones and Fernyhough, 2007; Langland-Hassan, 2008;
Whitford et al., 2012). Jones and Fernyhough (2007) provide
the clearest and most comprehensive explication of such an
approach. Their account is outlined in Figure 2, showing both
the specification of inner speech and the proposed disruptions in
schizophrenia.
The basic proposal is that inner speech, like outer speech and
other bodily acts, is a product of the motor control system in
such a way that it is compared to, and attenuated by, a predicted
state. The model holds that in the normal case of inner speech a
goal generates a representation of the desired state, and a motor
command is issued. The motor command results not only in
the occurrence of the action (in this case, inner speech occurs)
but also in the generation of the efference copy and predicted
state.
Just as with the comparator account of the sense of agency for
bodily actions, the approach holds that deficits in the predicted
state result in an abnormal experience of agency. The account
is a fairly direct transposition of the comparator account as it
applies to bodily actions. Firstly, a failure to generate a pre-
dicted state results in a lack of feeling of initiation for the inner
speech or, to use the term employed by Jones and Fernyhough
(2007, p. 395), “no emotion of self-authorship”. Secondly, the
same failure to generate a representation of the predicted state
results in a mismatch in the third comparator (C3), resulting
in the episode of inner speech being classified as non-self in
origin, or, to use Jones and Fernyhough’s (2007, p. 395) phrase,
resulting in an “emotion of other-authorship”. These two factors
are posited to combine to create a conscious experience of non-
self agency, which is then interpreted by “top-down” factors, i.e.,
conscious judgments, to give rise to an explicit misattribution of
agency.
PROBLEMSWITH THE TRADITIONAL COMPARATOR
ACCOUNT OF MISATTRIBUTED INNER SPEECH
The basic explication of the comparator account applied to inner
speech—that inner speech is normally predicted and attenuated
and that failures in this process contribute to misattribution—is
widely accepted both within the literature on the sense of agency
and beyond (e.g., Li et al., 2002; Johns et al., 2006; Vosgerau
and Newen, 2007; Synofzik et al., 2008a; Carruthers, 2011; Ford
and Mathalon, 2012; Whitford et al., 2012). In contrast to this
consensus, we argue that there are fundamental problems with the
comparator account as it is currently specified. These problems
mean that both the basic model of how inner speech is specified
within the motor control system and the account of how deficits
in prediction lead to misattributions of agency are untenable.
The critique will focus on Jones and Fernyhough’s version of the
comparator account, but the main points apply to any version of
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FIGURE 2 | The traditional comparator account of inner speech in the
motor control system and the sense of agency for inner speech in
schizophrenia, with relevant processes in black. The account holds that
inner speech is, like overt speech, the direct product of the motor command,
and that an efference copy is also produced. In pathology, a failure to send an
efference copy of the motor command means that no predicted state is
generated, leading to a lack of early awareness of the inner speech, and an
emotion of other authorship. Based on Jones and Fernyhough (2007), with
basic features of the motor control system as in Figure 1 (based on Frith
et al., 2000b; Blakemore et al., 2002; Synofzik et al., 2008a).
the account that maintains that inner speech is attenuated by a
predicted state.
Before outlining our concerns with the current account, it is
important to note that we will not challenge the basic proposal
that the motor control system may be involved in the production
of inner speech. Firstly, while the comparator model of the motor
control system was originally posited to account for motor-to-
somatosensory predictions in motor action, there is emerging
electrophysiological and behavioral evidence that the extension
of this model to motor-to-auditory predictions is plausible (Bäß
et al., 2008; Greenlee et al., 2010; Weiss et al., 2011; Knolle et al.,
2012). Secondly, there are several strands of evidence indicat-
ing that inner speech may be a product of the motor control
system (for a review see Stephane et al., 2001). This includes
developmental evidence that inner speech is related to early
private speech (Berk, 1992), evidence of structural similarities
between speech and inner speech (Dell and Repka, 1992), as
well as brain imaging data which support the hypothesis that the
same mechanisms are involved in both inner and outer speech
(Jeannerod, 2006). Moreover, to accept a motor system route to
inner speech does not rule out the possibility of alternative routes
to verbal imagery, for example, involving the reconstruction of
perceptual memories in modality specific cortices (Kosslyn et al.,
2001; Kosslyn, 2005; Moulton and Kosslyn, 2009). The critique
offered here therefore, relates not to whether inner speech is
functionally specified in the motor system, but rather how it is
specified.
PROBLEMSWITH THE SPECIFICATION OF INNER SPEECH IN THE
TRADITIONAL COMPARATOR ACCOUNT
As described above, the existing comparator account of misat-
tributed inner speech assumes that inner speech holds the same
functional position in the motor control system as actual speech.
This aspect of the account, and in particular the related proposi-
tion that inner speech is compared in the third comparator and
attenuated by the predicted state, forms a crucial aspect of the
approach’s account of the etiology of AVH. Despite this, Jones
and Fernyhough provide no clarification of the notion of inner
speech they have in mind, nor of its cognitive specification. One
clue comes from their diagrammatic representation of the model,
which indicates that the occurrence of inner speech based on
the motor command results in an “actual sensory experience”
(see Figure 2). Despite this nomenclature, there is strong reason
to believe that Jones and Fernyhough do not mean that the
production of inner speech results in external sensory output
(such as low level vocalization or muscle movements). Not only
do they clearly refer to inner speech as “purely cognitive” through-
out the article, they also expend considerable effort constructing
an argument (drawing on a Vygotskian (Vygotsky, 1934/1987)
developmental notion of private speech) for why we should
expect a purely cognitive event such as inner speech to be the
product of the motor control system in the first place. If they
meant the inner speech output in their model to consist of low
level vocalization with actual sensory consequences, then such
arguments would not be required. If the notion of inner speech
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they have in mind is purely cognitive, then the output which
they have labeled as “actual sensory consequence” would be better
described as imagery (quasi-perceptual representation) of what
the actual sensory consequences might have been had the speech
been produced. Such a characterization would be in line with
both their own description of inner speech as “purely cognitive”
and with standard cognitive characterizations of inner speech
(e.g., Carruthers, 2006; for an overview see Vicente and Martinez-
Manrique, 2011).
Given the information provided by Jones and Fernyhough,
this explication seems the most plausible way to characterize the
notion of inner speech in their model. However, further questions
remain. We leave open the question of the modality of inner
speech in their account. It is likely that they would follow other
theorists (e.g., Tian and Poeppel, 2012) in positing that this quasi-
sensory representation could occur in either the auditory or the
motoric and kinesthetic modalities, or in all three. More crucially,
it is unclear under their account what mechanisms are supposed
to generate the quasi-perceptual representation of inner speech.
In the case of overt speech as specified in the original model of
motor control, the motor command causes the bodily movement
to occur, actual sensory consequences follow, and these are picked
up by the sensory system and compiled into a representation
(the “estimated actual sensory consequences”, see Figure 1). In
Jones and Fernyhough’s model, the process by which the motor
command leads to quasi-sensory representation of inner speech
remains unspecified.
Moreover, it is unclear why there is a need to propose any
new mechanisms for the generation of inner speech. If inner
speech consists of a quasi-sensory representation of the likely
consequences of a given act of speech, then the motor control sys-
tem as originally specified already contains such a representation.
Recall that, according to the original comparator model of the
motor control system, an efference copy of the motor command
is sent to the forward model, which generates representation
of the predicted sensory consequences of performing the motor
command. We know that this predicted state must be in the same
representational format as the posited inner speech of Jones and
Fernyhough, since, according to them, both are inputs to the
third comparator. If the efference copy and forward model already
issues a quasi-perceptual representation of the predicted sensory
consequences of performing a given speech act, then would it not
be more parsimonious to consider that this representation—the
predicted state—would form the basis for inner speech? In the
normal case of overt action, the predicted state is a subpersonal
representation, but all that would be required to generate the con-
scious experience of inner speech would be to suppress the motor
command and make the predicted state available to conscious-
ness. Moreover, this specification of inner speech as derived from
the predicted state is just as consistent with the motivations pro-
vided by the Vygostkian development view of language that Jones
and Fernyhough offer. Firstly, inner speech is still a product of the
motor control system. Secondly, the predicted state is compared
to the desired state in the second comparator, providing a mech-
anism by which inner speech could be monitored and corrected.
In light of these issues, this traditional version of the com-
parator account of the sense of agency for inner speech faces
several challenges. Either the notion of inner speech needs to be
elaborated in order to explain how it is functionally different from
the predicted state, or, if it is not different, there needs to be an
explanation of why the motor control system would generate the
same state twice, and what would be gained from comparing it to
itself.
The alternative proposal we have offered—that the predicted
state could form the basis for inner speech—is not only more
parsimonious and well-defined than that provided by Jones and
Fernyhough, but also more consistent with leading theorizing
on motor imagery. As part of an extensive research program
over a number of years, Marc Jeannerod (2006) has proposed
an account of motor imagery based on the workings of the
motor control system. According to this influential theory, motor
imagery—conscious quasi-perceptual representation of motor
acts—is derived from the predicted state. His account forms
the basis for the specification of inner speech in at least one
leading theory of the architecture of the mind (Carruthers,
2006). Recently, Tian and Poeppel (2012) have expanded on this
approach to provide clear specification of how the forward model
and predicted state of the motor control system could generate
both the sensorimotor and auditory imagery associated with
inner speech.
Our analysis of the traditional comparator account of misat-
tributed inner speech suggests that the proposed specification of
inner speech in the motor control system is problematic. This in
turn calls into question the viability of the current comparator
account as a model for misattributions of agency. If inner speech
is, as we alternatively propose, derived from the predicted state,
then it is not normally attenuated and a mismatch in the third
comparator cannot account for its misattribution. It is possible
that these problems with the traditional comparator account
are at least implicitly recognized by some theorists. After initial
enthusiasm in earlier versions of his account (Frith, 1992), Frith
himself has become increasingly cautious about applying the
comparator account to inner speech (Frith, 2012).
PROBLEMSWITH THE EVIDENCE FOR THE TRADITIONAL COMPARATOR
ACCOUNT OF INNER SPEECH
Over the last 15 years a series of studies using electrophysiological
techniques has probed the responsiveness of the brain to auditory
probes during self-generated speech and inner speech. A primary
aim of this research was to test the predictions of the comparator
account as it applied to misattributed inner speech. Overall, the
results have been interpreted as suggesting that inner speech is
normally attenuated, and that there is a failure of attenuation of
inner speech in patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Ford
et al., 2001a,b,c, 2007; Ford and Mathalon, 2004, 2005, 2012;
Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007). As such, the results appear to
provide key evidence in favor of the current comparator account
of misattributed inner speech.
In this section we closely examine the details of these studies
and argue that there are problems with this common interpreta-
tion of the data. We suggest that even if we were to leave aside
the analysis provided in the previous section and accept for the
sake of argument that inner speech could plausibly be specified
as functionally equivalent to overt speech in the motor control
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system, the data from these electrophysiological studies cannot be
taken as supporting the traditional comparator account of inner
speech.
The auditory N1 is a negative-going event related poten-
tial (ERP) generated in the auditory cortex by transient audi-
tory stimuli, and has been the primary dependent measure on
which the series of studies by Ford et al. have been based. It
reaches its peak approximately 100 ms after stimulus onset and is
measured by electroencephalography (EEG). Magnetoencephalo-
graphic (MEG) studies measuring the N1’s magnetic counter-
part, the N1m, have shown that, while a subject is talking,
responsiveness of the auditory cortex to 1000 Hz tone probes is
dampened and delayed compared to while a subject is reading
silently (Numminen et al., 1999), or simply listening (Curio et al.,
2000). In line with the comparator account of motor control, the
reduction of N1m during talking in these studies was attributed
to the dampening effect of the predicted state. These findings
are consistent with a large body of research demonstrating the
attenuation of sensory consequences during bodily action across
modalities and across the animal kingdom (Crapse and Sommer,
2008).
Ford et al. expanded on this research to investigate N1 respon-
siveness to auditory stimuli not only in healthy controls, but
also in patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. The majority
of their studies focused on the differences in N1 responsive-
ness to auditory probes during overt talking as compared to
a baseline condition during which subjects heard the auditory
probes and were asked simply to focus on a fixation point.
Ford et al. describe this as the Talk/Listen paradigm. In some
studies the talking itself provided the auditory probe (and was
played back during the listen condition). In other studies separate
auditory probes were used (e.g., speech sounds [/ba/] and noises
[broadband]).
Across these studies involving overt speech, healthy controls
showed a significant difference in N1 responsiveness between
the baseline and talking conditions, with N1 responsiveness to
the auditory probe dampened while talking. In line with the
comparator account of the motor control system and the previ-
ous research described above, these findings were interpreted as
indicating that the predicted state attenuates incoming sensory
information during speech.
By contrast, the patient group showed no such difference
in N1 responsiveness between the talking and baseline condi-
tions. This was taken to indicate a failure of attenuation of
incoming sensory information, as predicted by the comparator
account of misattributions of bodily agency in schizophrenia.
While these results do provide good evidence of attenuation (and
failure of attenuation) during overt speech, it is not straight-
forward to assume that they can be extrapolated to shed light
on covert actions like inner speech. As noted in the previous
section, it is problematic to presume that inner speech plays
the same functional role in the motor control system as overt
speech, and there is evidence that an alternative model of inner
speech in the motor control may be appropriate. In the present
context, to draw conclusions about the posited attenuation of
inner speech from data relating to overt speech is to beg the
question.
Given this, only evidence that inner speech is itself attenuated,
and that failures of this attenuation are connected to schizophre-
nia, can be directly taken as evidence of the current comparator
account of misattributed inner speech. Just one of the studies
conducted by Ford et al. investigated levels of N1 responsiveness
during inner speech (Ford et al., 2001a; Ford and Mathalon,
2004). Drawing on the type of comparator account of inner
speech suggested by Jones and Fernyhough, the authors predict
that engaging in inner speech will lead to a reduction in N1
responsiveness due to attenuation by the predicted state associated
with the production of inner speech. As with the studies involving
overt speech, during a baseline condition subjects simply focused
on a fixation point and listened to the auditory stimuli. In the
inner speech condition the participants engaged in what the
authors refer to as “directed” inner speech by silently repeating
statements (e.g., “That was really stupid”). In both the inner
speech and baseline conditions, auditory probes were presented
(e.g., speech sounds [/ba/], noises [broadband]) and N1 response
to these stimuli was recorded.
The key results from the inner speech study were broadly
similar to those from the studies involving overt speech. Firstly,
in healthy controls the N1 responsiveness to the auditory probes
was reduced in the inner speech condition as compared to the
baseline condition. The authors take it that the production of
inner speech in the motor control system in this condition has
given rise to a predicted state, which has in turn attenuated not
only the inner speech itself, but also N1 responsiveness. Thus, the
result that N1 responsiveness was reduced during the inner speech
condition in the control subjects has been taken to support to
the basic proposition that inner speech is normally attenuated, as
proposed in the traditional comparator account of misattributed
inner speech.
In addition, the subjects with a diagnosis of schizophrenia
demonstrated no difference in N1 responsiveness to the auditory
probes between the inner speech and baseline condition. Ford
et al. (2001a) suggest this may be because in the case of the
inner speech produced by patients the predicted state “was not
functioning properly” and so “auditory cortical responsiveness...
might not have been dampened” (p. 1915). In line with the
traditional comparator account of misattributed inner speech,
this failure of attenuation of the N1 response is posited to reflect a
failure of attenuation of inner speech itself, which contributes to
symptoms such as AVH and thought insertion by causing a failure
of the “self/other signal” (p. 1915) or as they put in a later descrip-
tion (Ford and Mathalon, 2004), leading to “the misperception
that [. . .] thoughts have an external source” (p. 43).
These interpretations of the key data as being supportive of the
current comparator account of misattributed inner speech have
been repeated by Ford et al. in several reviews of the original
study (e.g., Ford and Mathalon, 2012) and in turn referenced
across the literature on the sense of agency for thought (e.g.,
Langland-Hassan, 2008). However, it is clear from a closer reading
of Ford et al.’ broader research program that this is not the
only, or even the best, interpretation of the key data from the
inner speech study. Firstly, it is important to note that the study
does not directly measure attenuation of inner speech, but rather
draws inferences about attenuation of inner speech from levels
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of N1 responsiveness. For this reason, interpretation of the N1
responsiveness data requires an a priori assumption about the
posited nature and direction of the relationship between N1
responsiveness and any supposed inner speech attenuation.
Specifically, the interpretation described above rests on the
assumption that a reduction in N1 responsiveness is the result
of attenuation by the predicted state and can be taken as a direct
indication that inner speech is itself also being attenuated. To put
it another way, the interpretation rests on the assumption that
a reduction in N1 responsiveness reflects a properly functioning
predicted state and properly attenuated inner speech. Elsewhere
in discussing the same series of studies, however, the authors
make the opposite a priori assumption, positing that reduced
N1 responsiveness could reflect a failure of predicted state, and
as indicating that inner speech itself has not been attenuated
(see details below). This is extremely problematic; if reduced N1
responsiveness can be plausibly interpreted as reflecting either a
properly functioning predicted state or a failure of the predicted
state, then it is impossible to draw firm conclusions about either
the specification of inner speech (whether it is normally attenu-
ated) or the role of prediction failure in schizophrenia from the
N1 data gathered in these studies.
Given the seriousness of this problem, it is worth spelling out
in detail this alternative contradictory framework as posited by
the authors. Firstly, Ford et al. make clear that attenuation by the
predicted state is not the only mechanism by which the depen-
dent measure of N1 responsiveness may be reduced. Acoustic
interference (for instance, listening to speech) is another possi-
ble mechanism for reduction of N1 responsiveness to auditory
probes, because the auditory cortex is already engaged (Ford et al.,
2001b; Ford and Mathalon, 2004). For instance, Ford et al. appeal
to this mechanism to explain why, in a third listening condition,
N1 responsiveness is at its lowest as compared to both baseline
and speech conditions for both patients and controls, even though
attenuation is clearly not at work (since the participants are not
engaging in speech); the reduction is argued to be the result of
acoustic interference from the short bursts of heard speech (Ford
et al., 2001b, p. 547).
Importantly, they appeal to this process of acoustic interfer-
ence again when explaining a set of findings from the baseline
conditions within studies. In this case their appeal to acoustic
interference has important implications for their interpretation of
the relationship between inner speech, the predicted state and N1
responsiveness. Recall that in the baseline condition, individuals
simply sit and listen to auditory probes. Across the various studies
involving both overt and covert speech the level of baseline N1
responsiveness to auditory probes was lower in the patient groups
than in the control group; that is, in the baseline condition the
patient’s N1 responsiveness seemed to have been dampened as
compared to baseline responsiveness of control subjects. Ford
et al. explain this finding by appealing to differential levels of
acoustic interference from inner speech in the control and patient
groups. This differential level comes not from different amounts of
inner speech—as they say, it is “likely that both control subjects
and patients engage in internal dialogue”, during the baseline
condition (Ford et al., 2001b, p. 547)—but rather from differences
in the level of attenuation of the inner speech between the control
and patient groups. Specifically, they posit that inner speech
in the patient group is not attenuated (due to a failure of the
predicted state, as proposed by the comparator account), meaning
that it causes greater acoustic interference, thereby reducing N1
responsiveness. In the control group they posit that inner speech
is correctly attenuated (in line with the comparator account) and
therefore interferes with the N1 less, meaning N1 responsiveness
is not reduced.
This explanation of the likely relationship between the atten-
uation of inner speech and N1 responsiveness offered in inter-
preting the data between the baseline conditions is in direct
contradiction of the interpretation offered in relation to the
key findings discussed above. In the key findings above Ford
et al. interpret reduced N1 responsiveness (in the control group
as compared to the patients in the inner speech condition) as
reflecting functioning attenuation of inner speech; when inner
speech is correctly attenuated by the predicted state, the N1
responsiveness is attenuated in the same way. But in discussing
the baseline findings, Ford et al. posit the inverse relationship,
whereby reduced N1 responsiveness (in the patient group as
compared to the control group) reflects a failure of attenuation
of inner speech; unattenuated inner speech interferes with the
auditory cortex, reducing N1 responsiveness.
That these two proposals about the relationship between inner
speech, attenuation by the predicted state and N1 responsiveness
are both available is not in itself problematic; both are theoret-
ically driven and internally consistent. What is problematic is
the coexistence of them in interpretation of the same set of data
without making their contradictions explicit. More simply, it is
impossible to draw any conclusions about the compatibility of
the key N1 responsiveness results with the comparator account
of misattributed inner speech if reduced N1 responsiveness could
plausibly indicate both functioning attenuation or a failure of
attenuation of inner speech. Had the findings revealed the oppo-
site pattern of findings for the key comparison between control
and patients in the inner speech condition—i.e., had they found
that N1 response was reduced in the patients rather than the
controls—this too could have been deemed in keeping with the
traditional comparator account of misattributed inner speech,
simply by appealing to the alternative a priori assumption regard-
ing the relationship between N1 responsiveness and inner speech
attenuation.
The above analysis reveals one additional note of caution about
interpreting the results from the inner speech study. It is clear
that Ford et al. did not control for the possibility that subjects
would engage in spontaneous inner speech during the baseline
condition. In fact, as noted above, in discussing the differences
between the baseline conditions in a similar study, Ford et al.
assume that participants were engaging in inner speech during the
baseline. This means that there are at least two alternative explana-
tions for the key findings from the inner speech study. Firstly, the
difference in patterns of N1 responsiveness could simply be due
to differential levels of spontaneous inner speech in the baseline
condition. Suppose, for instance, that patients tended to engage in
spontaneous inner speech in the baseline condition while those in
the control condition did not; the additional acoustic interference
provided by inner speech in the control subjects would explain the
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reduction in N1 responsiveness in the inner speech as compared
to the baseline condition, while the lack of difference between the
two conditions in the patient groups would be attributable to the
fact that N1 response was already affected by acoustic interference
from inner speech in the baseline condition. Alternatively, it could
be that levels of spontaneous inner speech were the same in
both patients and controls, but that the level of attention differed
between groups; if patients tended to pay more attention to their
spontaneous inner speech the same pattern of key results would
be expected. Notably, neither of these plausible explanations for
the pattern of data from the inner speech study makes any appeal
to mechanisms by which inner speech is predicted or attenuated,
as posited by the traditional comparator account of misattributed
inner speech.
The above analysis calls into question the leading evidence for
the current comparator account of misattributed inner speech. As
pointed out by Langland-Hassan (2008), there are other research
programs employing brain imaging which demonstrate results
consistent with the comparator account, but those other studies—
showing, for example, that the nervous system in patients with
AVH behaves as it would during normal speech perception
(Dierks et al., 1999)—are also consistent with alternative models
of AVH which do not appeal to a model of attenuated inner
speech (e.g., Allen et al., 2008). To date, the results from across
the Ford et al. studies have been held up as the leading evidence
in favor of the current model. This analysis reveals that the
common interpretation of these key data from the inner speech
study as supporting the comparator account of misattributed
inner speech is problematic. Not only is it impossible to conclude
from these data that the attenuation of inner speech is faulty in
schizophrenia, but it is also impossible to conclude that inner
speech is normally attenuated.
A NEW COMPARATOR ACCOUNT OF MISATTRIBUTED INNER
SPEECH
Given the emerging evidence that motor prediction failures
are associated with symptoms of hallucination and delusion in
schizophrenia (Frith, 2012), and the plausibility of the compara-
tor account as it applies to bodily action, there is a strong moti-
vation to seek a motor control based account of symptoms such
as AVH. However, in the previous two sections we have pointed
out fundamental flaws in the traditional comparator account of
misattributed inner speech, and highlighted inconsistencies in the
interpretation of the electrophysiological data commonly taken to
support the account.
There is one existing alternative comparator account of the
sense of agency for inner speech that (seemingly inadvertently)
sidesteps these problems by re-conceptualizing the process of
prediction in the motor control system as a process of filtering.
Langland-Hassan (2008) suggests that the idea of prediction
proposed by Miall et al. (1993) and Wolpert and Ghahramani
(2000) is not the only way in which Sperry (1950) and Holst and
Mittelstadt (1950) original model of the motor control system
could be cashed out, arguing that in the case of visual and auditory
modalities the motor control system could calculate the needed
cancellation of the incoming sensory information without ever
generating a full prediction of the actual input. Crucially, then, his
filter model “does not require that the ‘predictive’ signal itself be a
quasi-visual state” (Langland-Hassan, 2008, p. 383). This account
may avoid some of the problems of the traditional comparator
account by avoiding a proposal of “double prediction”, but it does
not provide a plausible alternative. Contemporary theory and
research indicates that the idea of predictive forward models based
on efference copies is ubiquitous across sensory domains (Pynn
and DeSouza, 2013). Not only does Langland-Hassan’s account
stand counter to this evidence, but it also entails a rather puzzling
and unjustified split in the functioning of the motor control
system’s forward modeling. While he proposes that prediction
does not occur in the visual and auditory modalities, in the case
of the somatosensory and kinesthetic domains Langland-Hassan
holds that the conceptualization of forward modeling as a process
of prediction is valid (Langland-Hassan, 2008, p. 381).
In this section we outline a new comparator account that we
take to provide the most viable model of how prediction failures
in the motor control system could give rise to misattributions
of inner speech. Unlike the traditional comparator account it
involves a clear and cognitively justified specification of inner
speech, is in line with leading theories of motor imagery, and
does not entail duplication of states in the motor control sys-
tem. Unlike Langland-Hassan’s account it does require a radical
re-conceptualization of the forward-modeling processes of the
motor control system.
The new account is based on a model of inner speech pro-
duction derived from the motor imagery literature (Carruthers,
2006; Jeannerod, 2006; Tian and Poeppel, 2012) and is consistent
with recent arguments that mental imagery is likely to be based on
full-blown simulation (Moulton and Kosslyn, 2009). This model
of ordinary inner speech assumes that inner speech is directly
derived from the predicted state. Inner speech begins, like overt
speech, in the formation of an intention (which can be a motor
intention, see Pacherie, 2008), leading to the generation of the
desired state and the required motor command. As in the case of
actual speech, an efference copy of the motor command is sent to
the forward model and a prediction of the sensory consequences
of the given speech act is produced.
It is clear from recent research that the predicted state can
comprise representations across sensory modalities, including
somatosensory, visual and auditory (Cullen, 2004; Pynn and
DeSouza, 2013). In line with the recent model of inner speech
proposed by Tian and Poeppel (2012), the model outlined here
holds that the prediction that forms the basis of inner speech
can incorporate both somatosensory (articulation imagery) and
auditory (hearing imagery) modalities (see also Tian and Poeppel,
2010). The predicted state, which during overt speech normally
remains in subpersonal processing, is made available to higher
levels of processing (for example, via global broadcasting, see
Carruthers, 2006). This process results in the first-person con-
scious experience of the episode of inner speech. The proposal
that the predicted state may form the basis of the sensory content
of inner speech is supported by recent behavioral studies (Scott,
2013; Scott et al., 2013).
In contrast to overt speech, in the case of inner speech the
motor command is suppressed. Because the motor command is
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suppressed, there are no actual sensory consequences and there
is no comparison in the third comparator. However, in line
with similar models of motor imagery (Grush, 2004; Jeannerod,
2006), and specifically inner speech (Tian and Poeppel, 2012),
the present model holds that the comparison in the second
comparator between the desired and predicted states still occurs.
We propose that during ordinary inner speech the match between
the desired state and the predicted state in the second comparator
contributes to the sense of agency for inner speech. The idea that
the comparison in the second comparator might contribute to
the sense of agency is not new. In at least one discussion of the
comparator account of the sense of agency for bodily action, Frith
has indicated that as well as the sense of initiation (derived from
the mere production of the predicted state) and the sense of self-
production (derived from the match in the third comparator) the
match between the intended and predicted state may evoke a sense
of “being in control” (Frith, 2005b, see also Synofzik et al., 2008a,
p. 221).
With this framework in place it is possible to provide a unified
and plausible account of how failures in motor prediction could
contribute to the misattribution of inner speech (Figure 3).
Following the traditional comparator account, we propose that
in schizophrenia there are disruptions somewhere in the process
of efference copy production and forward modeling, leading to
a faulty or inaccurate predicted state. We leave unspecified the
precise nature of this fault. The faulty prediction is proposed to
potentially occur across the various modalities that contribute to
ordinary inner speech (e.g., auditory and somatosensory). Thus,
the errors in prediction could encompass incorrect specification
in one modality (i.e., predicting the speech as louder or quieter,
faster or slower), or incorrect specification across modalities (i.e.,
predicting the speech as composed of more or less auditory
imagery relative to motor imagery). In line with traditional ver-
sions of the comparator account the deficit in the predicted state
is also proposed to be sporadic, meaning that the predicted state
will be accurate most or some of the time. Finally, these sporadic
errors in the predicted state will lead to instances of a mismatch in
the second comparator, whereby the predicted state will no longer
match the desired (intended) state.
The proposed deficit in the predicted state is likely to have
at least two distinct consequences for the phenomenology of the
associated inner speech. The first is that the prediction error
would directly translate into the patient’s conscious experience
of the resultant inner speech. In comparison to their ordinary
inner speech, the individual could find that they experience inner
speech which is unusual across any of the dimensions associated
with the prediction of the sensory consequences of speech; the
inner speech could be unusually slow/fast, unusually loud/quiet,
unusually auditory in nature, unusually clear/unintelligible etc. It
is these characteristics, which would differ from the characteristics
of ordinary, correctly predicted inner speech, that are proposed
lead the inner speech to be experienced as another person’s
FIGURE 3 | The new comparator account of inner speech in the motor
control system, also showing proposed disruptions to the experience of
inner speech in schizophrenia. The efference copy allows the production of
the predicted state to form the basis for conscious mental imagery (inner
speech), while the motor command is suppressed (those aspects of the
motor control system therefore not implicated in inner speech are shown
dotted). In ordinary inner speech the match in comparator two between the
predicted and desired states gives rise to a feeling of control. In
schizophrenia, failures in the predicted state directly affect the conscious
experience of the resultant inner speech (abnormal inner speech) and lead to
a mismatch in the second comparator, leading to abnormalities in the feeling
of intentional control.
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voice. It is possible that the precise nature of the prediction
errors would vary between, and even within, individuals, meaning
that the proposed deficit could give rise to a wide variety of
phenomenologically unusual cases of inner speech. Secondly, the
mismatch in the second comparator between the desired state
and the predicted state would mean that an unusual feeling of
agency would accompany the associated inner speech, potentially
a feeling that the inner speech is outside of intentional control.
The sporadic nature of the deficit means that these experiences
would be interspersed with episodes of phenomenologically ordi-
nary inner speech accompanied by an ordinary feeling of agency.
THE NEW COMPARATOR ACCOUNT AND EVIDENCE FROM THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF AVH
A primary motivation for developing a comparator account of
misattributed inner speech is to provide an etiological account of
AVH in schizophrenia. The new account that we have proposed
fits well with emerging evidence on the phenomenology of voice-
hearing in schizophrenia. The account predicts that AVH would
be experienced as outside of intentional control and unusual
across a range of phenomenological dimensions related to sensory
prediction. These predictions are in line with standard character-
izations of AVH which hold that, along with a phenomenology
of “externality”, AVH are commonly experienced as both uncon-
trolled and compellingly perceptually real (Moritz and Larøi,
2008; Waters et al., 2012; Wu, 2012).
The account’s predictions are also in line with a recent study
which confirmed that AVH differ from patients’ ordinary inner
speech along a number of dimensions related to their perceptual
phenomenology, including their speed (compared to a normal
rate of speaker), intelligibility (understandable or garbled) and
volume (Langdon et al., 2009). Moreover, while patients were
able to describe the nature of various vocal characteristics of
their AVH (the perceived gender, age, accent and class of the
voices), the majority reported that their ordinary inner speech
was free of such characteristics and “more like words in the
head than a voice in the head” (Langdon et al., 2009, p. 661).
As several theorists have concluded, the traditional comparator
account of misattributed inner speech struggles to explain these
phenomenological differences, since it predicts only differences in
the experience of agency (Langdon et al., 2009; Wu, 2012).
In addition, our new account proposes that the precise effect
of prediction failure could differ between individuals, and would
therefore predict that AVH could vary across individuals in terms
of any phenomenological dimension associated with prediction,
including spatial location (predicting how close the voice will
sound), identity of the voice (predicting the tone and timbre
of speech), and reality (prediction of auditory characteristics
in general). This is in line with the emerging evidence that
voice-hearing in schizophrenia is a diverse and heterogeneous
experience which varies along a number of phenomenologi-
cal dimensions, including those commonly held to character-
ize the experience (Junginger and Frame, 1985; Chadwick and
Birchwood, 1994; Oulis et al., 1995; Nayani and David, 1996;
Leudar et al., 1997; Watkins, 1998; Stephane et al., 2003; Jones,
2008; Moritz and Larøi, 2008; Daalman et al., 2011; McCarthy-
Jones and Fernyhough, 2011). For example, Stephane et al. (2003)
found variation in terms of the clarity of AVH (ranging from clear,
like external speech, to deep, like thinking in words), personi-
fication (e.g., whether it was a male or female voice), loudness
(from not having loudness at all, to being softer than or as loud
as normal speech), whether voices outside were within or outside
of normal hearing range, and whether the voice was attributed
to themselves or to another agent. The traditional comparator
account of misattributed inner speech struggles to explain this
variation between individuals.
OPEN QUESTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The new comparator account of misattributed inner speech draws
on a significant reconceptualization of inner speech in the motor
control system and makes novel predictions about the likely con-
sequences of motor control failure, thus prompting new research
questions and reshaping existing ones. The new model should be
of particular interest to researchers investigating the neurocog-
nitive basis of misattributions of both speech and inner speech
within the comparator account framework. We have highlighted
ambiguities in the way in which Ford et al. have interpreted their
findings on the electrophysiological basis of inner speech, appeal-
ing both to the traditional view that inner speech is attenuated and
an alternative view in which it is inner speech does the attenuating
(see Section Problems with the Evidence for the Traditional Com-
parator Account of Inner Speech). It is hoped that the explication
of a new comparator account may provide a clearer framework in
which to interpret data from these and future studies.
Another question relates to the viability of the theoretical
account of inner speech on which the account is based (e.g.,
Tian and Poeppel, 2012). Questions remain about how such a
theoretical model of inner speech would be instantiated within
the networks of the brain (for an overview of possible neural
instantiation of the basic comparator account of motor control,
see Ramnani, 2006), and how it relates to other models of verbal
thought, inner speech and auditory imagery (e.g., Levelt, 1983;
Kinsbourne, 2000; Fernyhough, 2004; Kosslyn, 2005; Kraemer
et al., 2005; Carruthers, 2006; Baddeley, 2007; Leaver et al.,
2009). The model of inner speech also faces phenomenological
questions. If ordinary inner speech is derived from the predicted
sensory consequences of a motor command to speak, why, for
many individuals, is inner speech ordinarily experienced as silent
(e.g., Langdon et al., 2009)? And while the new comparator
account fits well with the phenomenology of voice-hearing in
schizophrenia, there are some elements of the phenomenological
data that it struggles to explain, such as apparent differences in
the form, pragmatics and content of patients’ inner speech and
AVHs (Langdon et al., 2009). There are two possible approaches
to making our new account compatible with this type of evidence.
The first would be to appeal to a higher order conceptual process
that interacts with the outputs of the motor control system such
that it is only the combination of the two processes that leads
to the experience of AVH. Under this picture, only inner speech
that is both the product of faulty prediction and has a certain
type of content (for example) would be experienced as a voice.
This approach would be similar to Synofzik et al.’s multifactorial
weighting model, which holds that a variety of top-down and
bottom-up cues are integrated to give rise to the experience of
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 675 | 11
Swiney and Sousa New inner speech comparator account
agency (Synofzik et al., 2008a,b, 2009a,b, 2013; Synofzik and
Voss, 2010; Synofzik and Vosgerau, 2012). Another approach
would be to hold that top-down conceptual processes taking into
account things like inner speech content and pragmatics could
directly impact subpersonal processes, such that prediction errors
would be more likely to occur in relation to certain episodes of
inner speech.
There are also questions relating to the potential explanatory
scope of the new account. In the present article we have focused
on the account’s ability to provide an etiological account of AVH,
but it is possible that it might be extended to explain delusions
of thought insertion or even other thought interference delusions
such as thought influence or thought broadcasting. It is difficult to
assess the extent to which the new comparator model can provide
an explanation for delusions of thought interference because of
the paucity of research into the phenomenology of these experi-
ences. Based on the limited evidence currently available, we have
previously argued that the phenomenology of thought insertion
is best characterized in terms of an anomalous sense of agency for
thought, meaning that the new comparator account may provide
an account of these delusions (Sousa and Swiney, 2013). However,
we argued more specifically that thought insertion is character-
ized by the sense that a thought as been generated or produced by
another agent, rather than a sense of external intentional control
(what we called intentional guidance, Sousa and Swiney, 2013).
This more precise characterization is somewhat out of step with
the predictions of the new comparator account proposed here. It
also remains an open question as to whether inserted thoughts
are experienced as perceptually unusual, as the new comparator
account would predict.
A related question concerns the modal range of conscious
mental imagery that might be affected by the disruptions pro-
posed in the new account. The discussion so far has concentrated
on how failures in the prediction of speech acts could give rise
to anomalous inner speech, but there is reason to suspect that the
account might extend to other types of imagery. Jeannerod (2006)
detailed account of motor imagery entails that the full range of
imagery (visual, kinesthetic, tactile) is derived from the predicted
state of the motor control system, and there is evidence that
conscious motor imagery is impaired or altered in schizophrenia
across a variety of modalities. Recent research indicates that in
schizophrenia imagined movements to grasp a target object show
no reliable relationship to target size, suggesting an impairment in
imagined movement (Danckert et al., 2002). Another study found
that in contrast to patients without symptoms such as delusions of
alien control and thought insertion, patients with such symptoms
had slowed imagined pointing movements (Maruff et al., 2003).
Finally, recent research has revealed that patients with schizophre-
nia were slower in imagining walking movements as compared to
normal controls (Lallart et al., 2012). The researchers undertaking
these studies have operated under a theoretical framework in
which motor imagery is assumed to derive from the predicted
state (as depicted in relation to inner speech in Figure 3). As
such, the findings have been taken as providing support for the
comparator account of misattributed bodily action, since they
indicate problems with motor prediction. But considered in light
of the model proposed here, they suggest that prediction failures
may have direct consequences for phenomenology across a range
of imagistic modalities. If this were the case, the explanatory scope
of the account could be widened. For example, some cases of
thought insertion appear to refer to “inserted” episodes of visual
imagery (Mellor, 1970, p. 17). Also, if failures in the prediction
of speech imagery contribute to the hallucination of voices, it is
possible that other types of hallucinatory experiences could be
explained by appeal to faults in the predictive processes under-
pinning other modalities of conscious motor imagery.
Finally, it is clear that even if a comparator account of mis-
attributed inner speech is viable, disruptions to the predicted
state will not be the only factor that contributes to pathological
symptoms. As alluded to in previous versions of the comparator
account and spelled out in a recent elaboration of the account
(Synofzik et al., 2008a), subpersonal cues from the motor control
system are likely to be only one cue contributing to the sense
of agency for thought. The comparator account outlined here is
intended only to provide a viable picture of how motor control
prediction failures could conceivably contribute to misattribu-
tions; it is not intended as a full account of the sense of agency
for mental acts.
CONCLUSIONS
Since its inception over 25 years ago the comparator account
has come to dominate and define the expanding literature on
the sense of agency, capturing the imagination of theorists from
across the cognitive sciences. Its popularity stems in large part
from its potential to provide a unified account of how failures
in motor prediction could contribute to the etiology of both
delusions of alien control and AVH in schizophrenia. In the case of
AVH the comparator account has traditionally assumed that inner
speech is cognitively specified in the motor control system in the
same way as overt bodily actions, subject to the same processes of
prediction and attenuation.
In the present paper we have challenged this traditional
account, outlining problems with the specification of inner speech
on which it is based and with the interpretation of the electrophys-
iological evidence commonly cited in its favor. We have provided a
new comparator account of misattributed inner speech, appealing
to the same failures in motor prediction, but relying on a different
specification of inner speech within the motor control system.
The new account makes novel predictions about the experience of
misattributed inner speech that fit well with the phenomenolog-
ical evidence on voice-hearing in schizophrenia. It also provides
a framework for future neurocognitive research on the effect of
motor prediction failures on inner speech.
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